In the writings of Bernard Stiegler, one of his most striking critiques of Martin Heidegger is that throughout the multifaceted investigations of technology, from Being and Time to "The Question Concerning Technology," Heidegger does not address the inherently technological character of the way in which particular languages or traditions, what may be called the content of humanity's historicity, are handed down (überliefern) to human beings. In this paper, I hold Stiegler's critique to provide the basis for a possible supplement to Heidegger's examination of history, memory, and technology. This supplement is necessary because for Stiegler a philosophical examination of the structures of history and memory, for it to be completely accurate concerning the phenomena it purports to describe, must examine the process by which history and memory is transmitted and preserved. This process can only be understood through the subsequent examination of particular technological artifacts temporally specific to the particular historico-temporal moments of that transmission and preservation. Stiegler's critique
thus encourages a rereading of Heidegger's statements concerning technology and technological artifacts in light of this supplement.
I propose that one way of more clearly understanding this supplement is to anchor a discussion of it to the concepts of the modern library and the printed books housed there.
1 I do this for two reasons. The first is that it is a commonplace to speak of books and the institutions that permit access to them, libraries in particular, as the means by which, among other things, the thoughts of the author can be accessed by successive generations of readers. As such, it would seem that an examination of the process of history and memory's transmission and preservation would naturally begin with the book and the library. The second, if we begin to think more like
Heidegger, is that the book considered as an artifact situated in a particular time and place can be understood to echo the structure of the temporality of Dasein conceptually, in the sense that a book is a thing present before the reader, written and published in the past, and imbued by the author with the intent of being read in the future. Books as artifacts permit the reader to, quite literally, have contact with the work and experiences of human beings no longer alive, and are, at least for the moment, still the primary means by which we learn of and from the past. 2 A detailed examination of Heidegger's various mentions of books and libraries, which I will conduct below,
shows how important an examination of particular technological artifacts is for anchoring the philosophical examination of history and memory's transmission and preservation to the particular technological means by which that transmission and preservation occurs.
In this paper, I examine three exemplary texts, from the beginning, middle, and end of (Phaedrus 68). Plato goes on to claim that writing will atrophy people's memories. Trust in writing will make them remember things by relying on marks made by others, from outside themselves, not on their own inner resources, and so writing will make the things they have learnt disappear from their minds. Your invention is a potion for jogging the memory, not for remembering. (69) Plato thus appears to be privileging speech over writing, in the sense that those who strive to be wise, the philo-sophoi, will not depend on the writing of others, understood as artificial and hence technical, to remember the knowledge they accumulate, but instead will strive to be able to remember solely from their own powers.
The first and obvious problem with Plato's claim concerning writing is that hypomnesis, between the internal memory of an individual and the external memory aids, e.g., books, which are held to weaken the ability of that internal memory.
Discussing the same passage, Heidegger notes a similar opposition between mneme and hypomnesis: they are "essentially different," as mneme is "a going back, a repetition and appropriation of the matters themselves," while hypomnesis "is a mere reminder, one that adheres to the spoken word" (Plato's Sophist 237) . It is in the midst of this discussion that
Heidegger also notes the association of mneme with sophias aletheia ('wise truth') and hypomnesis with doxa, ('public opinion') (237), lost in the English translation quoted earlier. 4 Heidegger here does not comment on nor critique Plato's bifurcation of memory and external aids to memory-of which writing, and, one may conclude, books, are examples. However, turning back to Derrida, we are to understand that it is the sophist, the figure associated with opinion and often functioning in Plato as the antithesis or mirror image of the philosopher striving for truth (aletheia), who "sells the signs and insignia or science: not memory itself Linking several strands of the above discussion together, Stiegler writes that the question of time is apprehended on the basis of the techno-logical problematic of artificial memory, always the memory of the human qua already-there. The already-there is the pregiven horizon of time, as the past that is mine but I have nevertheless not lived, to which my sole access is through the traces left of that past. This means that there is no already-there, and therefore no relation to time, without artificial memory supports. The memory of the existence of the generations that preceded me, and without which I would be nothing, is bequeathed on such supports. (159) The already-there, or, the world into which human beings are born/thrown in Heidegger's terms, is technical at its core. This is because the totality of the already-there has been made through artifice, or techne: "there is time only because memory is 'artificial,' becoming constituted as already-there since its 'having been placed outside of the species'" (172).
We are now prepared to understand hypomnesis as Stiegler defines it properly:
"recollection through externalized memory" ("Memory" 67). Hypomnesis is thus the process which the living individual undertakes in order to recollect something, be it a fact, an idea, or an argument, with the support of nonliving epiphylogenetic artifacts, i.e., instantiations of externalized memory. We are immediately reminded here of Plato's apparent disparaging of hypomnesis in the Phaedrus, placing it in the orbit of sophistry, in contrast to anamnesis which is related to wisdom and truth. By contrast, as is evident from the above discussion of Stiegler's writings, for Stiegler, as for Derrida, hypomnesis is constitutive of the human as such. This is because it is through the hypomnesic processes of interpreting epiphylogenetic artifacts that human beings come to understand temporality, i.e., through the individual recognizing that particular individual's past as part of, and dependent on, a past greater than itself that, in turn, it did not live. In Being and Time, Heidegger outlines what Stiegler calls a "structure of inheritance," one that starts "from the analysis of the world as the world of objects [and] which forms, at the heart of the system of referring, what he calls the already-there of historicality, of Geschichtlichkeit" (Stiegler, . The problem, implicit in Stiegler's work discussed above, is made explicit: in his analysis of the structure of inheritance, "Heidegger does not raise the question here of the actual conditions of this inheritance, inasmuch as they are already inscribed in its originary technicity" (158). It is therefore to Being and Time that we now turn, in order to outline this structure of inheritance and thereby both to recognize the purchase of Stiegler's critique more clearly, and, more generally, to contrast the above Stieglerian conception of the book and the library with Heideggerian ones. PhaenEx
II. The Book as "Fated Equipment:" Being and Time
In order to undertake the task of this paper we must examine several concepts used in Heidegger calls that thing's "in-order-to [um-zu]" (97). For Heidegger, the totality of things embedded in the structure of this in-order-to can extend even to places. For example, a room and its contents (e.g., a library) is understood as existing in order to serve the purposes of whatever the larger totality of which the room is a part is deigned to accomplish (97-98). Individual things (e.g., books) emerge from, or become distinct as things in light of, this totality as manipulable things, but always in reference to the totality. Heidegger calls the form of existing, or Being, of these individual things "readiness-to-hand [Zuhandenheit]" (98), in the sense that they are there ready to be used for Dasein's projects. It is important to note that readiness-to-hand is "the kind of Being characteristic of those entities which are proximally discovered within-the-world"
.
Next, Dasein has the existential character of "Being-ahead-of-itself [Vorwegsein] ," in the sense that it "has already compared itself, in its Being, with a possibility of itself" (236). This futural orientation of Dasein toward its own possibilities is for Heidegger a fundamental aspect of human existence. However, equally fundamental is thrownness (Geworfenheit), or Dasein's "facticity of its being delivered over" (174). Dasein always already finds itself thrown into its world at any particular moment, while at the same time oriented toward its own possibilities.
This structure maps on to Dasein's quality of temporality: having been thrown into a world at some past moment, finding oneself as thrown in the present, and oriented toward the future possibilities determined by that thrownness.
Heidegger connects the concept of readiness-to-hand and the tripartite temporal structure In section 74 of Being and Time, titled "The Basic Constitution of Historicality,"
Heidegger states plainly that " [c] are is grounded in temporality" (434). Now, part of Dasein's temporal structure is that, in considering its possibilities, Dasein projects (entwerfen) 9 itself into the future in accordance with those possibilities. This is not to say that Dasein begins from a particular position and then plans in accordance with some future goal; rather, "Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities" (185). One possible interpretation is that, as equipment, books are thereby determined as part of the existential structure of fated Dasein itself. Regardless, at no point in the text does Heidegger confront the technical character of books or libraries. More explicit mentions of both are to be found in his later writings, however, and it is to these later works that we now turn. Picture" that the modern epoch is characterized by human beings considered to be "that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth" (128). 11 This means that the world is grasped as an object, in contradistinction to "the primary and only real subiectum" (128), humanity. The defining parameters of the world as this object are, for
III. The Modern Book and the Modern
Heidegger, delimited by specifically modern science beginning with Descartes (127).
12
The library as it is conceived in the modern epoch can be considered as a symptom of the age of the world picture. Heidegger distinguishes between two types of what we would call academics or intellectuals, namely the scholar and the research man. These types arise in accordance with "the modern character of science as ongoing activity" (125). In the modern age,
[t]he scholar disappears. He is succeeded by the research man who is engaged in research projects. These, rather than the cultivating of erudition, lend to his work its atmosphere of incisiveness. The research man no longer needs a library at home. Moreover, he is constantly on the move. He negotiates at meetings and collects information at congresses. He contracts for commissions with book publishers. The latter now determine along with him which books must be written. (125, my italics)
Heidegger here is criticizing the modern age's obsession with the new, the fresh, the incisive, at the potential loss of the possibility of "creative questioning and shaping out of the power of genuine reflection [Besinnung]" (136) . As the paradigmatic case of the human investigator into what is of this era, the research man no longer needs a home library. This statement can be interpreted in at least three ways. First, the intended critique may be that the research man no longer needs to read the classical works of the past in order to be successful at research, or at least no longer needs to have them at hand for consultation. This is because the works of the past, as past, would be from the perspective of the research man lacking in present-oriented incisiveness. Second, and perhaps more telling, it is likely that Heidegger experienced the rapid growth of the modern library as an institution, both academic and public, in his lifetime. Hence, there may be an element of critique directed against that institution itself: if the library's collection is not carefully chosen by the scholar, the content of the library will be subject to the whims of modernity, i.e., its content will be determined by those responsible for which books are written, research men and their publishers. The third possibility is that, as not 'at-home,' the modern library is instead a receptacle or depot wherein books are stored, waiting to be accessed (as standing-reserve, perhaps?), rather than things in the world to be comprehended poetically and hence 'dwelled with.' 13 This may mean that in his statement on libraries, Heidegger is prefiguring the argument concerning the totalizing power of modern technology, Enframing, several years before explicitly identifying this concept in "The Question Concerning
Technology." The statement, however, remains ambiguous.
Held under the sway of modernity's picture of the world, the modern researcher, in the attempt to appear timely, no longer works out of /in response to the particular historical tradition into which the researcher is thrown. The modern researcher no longer needs a basis in the past from which to work in the present. According to Heidegger, in the modern age there is only the present, only the new. In a further elaboration of the role of books in the modern age, Heidegger claims that their specifically modern form, "[t]he preponderance of collections, of sets of books, of series and pocket editions" (139), is again a symptom of holding humanity to be the ground of any and all understandings of Being. This is because modern books are part of "a procedure that plans and establishes itself with a view to the way in which, through the prearranged and limited publication of books and periodicals, they are to bring the world into the picture for the public and confirm it publically" (139). The modern book is thus for Heidegger the means of publically disseminating the notion of humanity as the primary and only subiectum, hence perpetuating the age of the world picture. This tendency dovetails with the aims of modern researchers, for the modern form of the book permits those researchers "not only [to be] acknowledged and given consideration more easily and more rapidly…but, reaching a wider public, they immediately achieve their intended effect" (139). Heidegger's concern with technology as a concept, one that will receive greater attention later in his life, is hinted at in "The Age of the World Picture:" "[t]he research worker necessarily presses forward of himself into the sphere characteristic of the technologist in the essential sense. Continuing, the essence of modern technology, as a mode of revealing, is dangerous for Heidegger, as it has the potential power to close off all other possible modes of revealing.
Drawing together and defining the world, the things within it, and humanity itself, modern technology thus has the character of Enframing (Gestell). 14 Heidegger elaborates:
Enframing, that unconcealment [or aletheia, or ways of revealing] comes to pass in conformity with which the work of modern technology reveals the real as standing-reserve" (19) . In what way, then, can Enframing be confronted? For Heidegger, this "must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art" (35). Art is akin to the essence of technology in the sense that it is one way of revealing beings in their Being, but is fundamentally different in that it "brings the true into the splendor," i.e., it lets beings reveal their Being-that which "shines forth most purely" (34 
IV. Concluding Remarks: 'Dead Memories' in Cloud Atlas
The argument developed throughout this paper used the book and the library as The novel itself is made up of 11 chapters, each appearing in the narrative arc of the novel as a particular type of media: handwritten journal, series of handwritten letters, novel, film, and even holographic projection, only to return to spoken narrative, specifically the telling of a story around a campfire, in the central chapter. Each chapter is also written in the style of a particular definable genre: travel writing, Gothic novel, thriller, broad comedy, and two forms of science fiction defined by the common sci-fi tropes of the problems inherent in the rise of artificial intelligence and the world after an apocalyptic event, respectively. In the narrative, the first chapter is encountered as a document by a character in the second chapter, the second as a document in the third, and so forth until the sixth chapter. After this chapter, the order reverses, and the reader of Mitchell's novel passes through the conclusions of each story until finally arriving where she began, with the conclusion of the first chapter of the book.
Through its focus on epiphylogenetic technical artifacts (journals, novels, holographic projections) and how those artifacts are encountered and processed in the course of the narrative, Cloud Atlas can be seen as instantiating via fiction Stielger's epiphylogenesis-mnemotechniquehypomnesis complex. The first work, the travel journal, is an epiphylogenetic artifact produced via writing, i.e., a mnemotechnique. The journal is then encountered in the second chapter via the particular character's reading the journal, i.e., an act of hypomnesis. This pattern repeats It is hoped that the brief discussion above shows how Cloud Atlas can serve both as a means by which to approach, and an illustrative example of, Stiegler's philosophical concepts.
Indeed, much as the characters in the novel, from Stiegler's perspective we are perpetually haunted by spirits, spirits which-in this case through the specific technology of the 'dead matter' of the printed word-seem to find no discussion in Heidegger's work. And yet, in
considering Cloud Atlas, we may follow Heidegger's advice, if not his direction, through taking the site of confrontation with the essence of modern technology to be that of art. To conclude, then, death and dead memories haunt Heidegger, Stiegler, and the characters of Cloud Atlas, and yet those memories remain, for them and for us, the 'other means' in accordance with which life continues to evolve. exteriority can only arise via "the nonpresence of the other inscribed within the sense of the present, without the relationship with death as the concrete structure of the living present" (71). While I certainly do not wish to conflate the concepts of the Derridean trace and the Stieglerian epiphylogenetic memory, they certainly share many common features.
